Peace and Security (1st e-discussion)

Hello Bojan. Thank you for contributing to the discussion. I agree, engaging with actors across the board, from policymakers, researchers and civil society actors is an effective way of getting closer to achieving the goal. We need to work with changemakers, especially those working on the ground. This is essential in order to see tangible results. Do you have any examples of this from your experience?

Natasha Palansuriya This will be a bit of a plug for the work we are doing at Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies, but hopefully will help in answering your questions. There is a growing mobilization of local leaders, Mayors specifically, in responding to issues of violence, crime, and insecurity more broadly. Many of them are keen to tap into the knowledge and best practices on how to deal with protracted effects of COVID-19, among the rising insecurity, in their cities and are quite keen to test out new approaches and interventions. It would be interesting to look into how we can use the COVID-19 pandemic to expand the 'tent' of usual suspects involved in peacebuilding and work on violence reduction more broadly.

Let me also add that engagement by youth and young people are also encouraging. Initiatives such as the recently launched SFCG fund on Youth, Peace and Security (see more info: https://www.sfcg.org/the-youth-peace-and-security-fund/) are attempts at supporting the work of informal and decentralized groups of young people working to build peace in their communities. 

Bojan Francuz This sounds very encouraging. Thank you for sharing your insights and also the SFCG resource. The move towards focusing on your as key actors in peacebuilding/social cohesion is imperative.  

Hey Bojan, 

It is great to be part of the conversation on behalf of GPPAC. 

I just wanted to drop in a quick point about the importance of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda and its link to human security, for reducing violence. 

At GPPAC, we draw on the linkages between human security and WPS Agenda. We rejected the idea that the WPS Agenda is the one that only serves to open political spaces for women’s participation and bring attention to women’s needs in conflict. While it is a critical resource to recognise and address the unique needs of women, we see and advance the WPS as a critical framework to transform security approaches towards the security of the people in all their diversity. This Agenda encourages looking at rootcauses of conflict from the perspective of power and how this power is divided to people. In the Pacific, we have been successfully advancing the WPS principles to integrate human security principles in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security. And we know that integrating human security in peacebuilding is a process and placing human security at the centre of analysis has its implications for the assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation of peacebuilding initiatives. It has implications to understanding who is at the table and what evidence we pay attention to. 

Therefore, in order to advance SDGs, primarily SDG16+, we need to be looking at strengthening human security and using women's expertise to do so. 

Hi Carlo, 

Thank you very much for your interesting reflections on some of the gaps in research and emerging trends. The points you raise on the ingroup social cohesion which could have adverse effects on intergroup trust and relationships bring new and insightful perspectives for peacebuilding at large, and which tends to be highly relevant to discuss in the context of Covid-19. It would be very interesting to learn more about this topic as well as on the other topics, such as how the socio-economic- and political status of women potentially could be affected by exposure to violence. Are there any available studies on these topics that you could share or direct us to? Thank you!

Hi Carlo. Your research on ingroup social cohesion sounds extremely interesting. Specifically how it has revealed that 'ingroup cohesion can have adverse consequences for developing intergroup trust and relationships with other ethnic or religious communities'. This is an interesting angle compared to what I have been studying... which is the importance of justice (specifically transitional justice) after an armed conflict in preventing the recurrence of violence. In fact, in the Sri Lankan context (which I'm studying) we believe that although the war is over the conflict is not, because there are still unaddressed grievances, and the root of the conflict has not been addressed, therefore affecting social cohesion adversely. Concerningly we have seen the conflict spill over to other ethnic/religious communities, and we have observed obvious markers of the cycles of violence. So, it would be interesting to also look at this from the perspective you present in your research. Please do share any published material you may have.

This point on civil wars and women's empowerment is extremely valuable. As we have observed in Sri Lanka - and I think it can be extended to most countries in the Global South - that politics is viewed as "man's game" - where, like you said, to get into politics (and more so to win a seat in parliament) requires economic status and/or connections - so yes, the women we see in parliament are those who have this kind of social and economic backing. But we have seen an urgency in women on the ground to be changemakers - for example, those advocating for post-war justice and human rights, and community rights are women - those sitting on the streets in protest - sometimes for months at a time - demanding answers and change are women (mothers, wives, and sisters). Ultimately they know the pulse of their communities and they can bring about the changes that are direly needed. However, they rarely get a seat at the table. Most importantly, in relation to the WPS agenda - it has been proven through community-level peace-building interventions that not only were women directly affected by the conflict and have been victims of war-time violations and gender-based violence but also play an important role as peace advocates and bridges between communities. It is clear that women can be bridges where men cannot.

Ulrika Jonsson 

I agree, it's so relevant for peace and state-building but my impression is that in the past, attention has focused a lot on macro-level interventions like power sharing agreements, SSR, DDR, elections, institution building, constitutional reform. These are all extremely important, but the looking at the local level in a systematic manner offers really powerful insights to better understand the attitudes and behavior of the citizens.

The studies I am largely talking about look at the individual level and basically compare people who have been exposed to violence to those who haven't. As I mentioned, most of these studies look at the impact of conflict exposure on social trust, in-group cohesion measured as prosocial and cooperative behavior. Very little on intergroup relations and political trust as far as I know. Some exceptions look at these aspects:

There is one paper by De Juan/Pierskalla (2016) in post-conflict Nepal which shows that people exposed violence have lower trust in political institutions. Gates/Justensen (2020) also find a negative effect on political trust in Mali. There are some more studies which compare political trust at the country level between conflict and non-conflict countries, but I think they conceal too much since armed conflict is typically not evenly distributed within countries. 

I have been working on some papers to better understand how different forms of violence (rape, killings, mutilation) affect social engagement/cohesion in Sierra Leonean communities (Koos 2019). And there is a new working paper, where we compare the effects of sexual violence (and other forms of violence) by armed groups on civic engagement, interethnic trust and political trust in Liberia, DRC and Sri Lanka (Koos/Traunmüller 2021) in which we show that these effects differ across these dimensions: civic engagment (positive), interethnic trust (mixed), political trust (negative).

With regard to the micro-level effects of civil wars and armed conflict on women's social, economic and political empowerment, there are only handful of micro-level studies. Two from Bosnia (Hadzic/Tavits 2019, Hadzic/Tavits 2020) and one from my brilliant co-author Summer Lindsey on DR Congo on how gender norms are affected in conflict-affected communities (not yet published). On that subject, I have just submitted a research proposal to systematically explore the multi-dimensional impacts of civil wars on women in Colombia, DR Congo and Sri Lanka.

If you do not have access to any of these studies, I am happy to send them to you by email.

Natasha Palansuriya 

You make excellent points. You see, as a researcher it worries me slightly when studies are being published that promote the "general" idea that war promotes women's empowerment when in fact there is a lot of complex interactions going on and that some may benefit but others don't. It happens so quickly that such studies are taken out of context (especially when these are cross-country analyses). I have been reading on the impact of the civil war in Sri Lanka on women to prepare this research project I recently submitted. And it seemed quite evident that war-affected women (who lost their husband for instance) are socially very active but nevertheless live in poverty or don't have access to land. So, the effects can very significanlty across different dimensions of empowerment. If that project gets funded, it would be great to get in touch and perhaps cooperate because one part of it will be Sri Lanka.

Carlo Koos yes definitely. Happy to talk further regarding this. Thank you again for your contribution to this discussion. 

Carlo Koos 

Certainly, the comparative & micro-level analyses looking into the inter-group cohesion and political trust levels depending on exposure to violence (of all its forms) would be very interesting to explore further, and bringing forward a new important perspective. The research that you share indeed turns some attention to this and many thanks for listing the different available resources! 

It will be interesting to follow this new line of research and not the least when looking at the effects of Covid-19 as a potential exacerbator in these contexts of already weak inter-group trust and social cohesion. Are you aware of any upcoming research that will look into this linkage of Covid-19 and the micro-level comparative analyses on inter-group trust etc.?  Thanks a lot!

Thanks Carlo! As you mention ingroup cohesion and identities, I am reminded of mass trauma, group healing and conflict transformation. Mass traumas have a way to hardening group identities and leading to groups/communities to look inward- leading to greater ingroup cohesion. Peacebuilding practitioners have been working with mass and individual traumas for the past 2 decades or so. Development practitioners less so as a development intervention. Any research on mass and historical traumas on recovery and peacebuilding is much appreciated.

The idea that increase in state legitimacy through greater service delivery is indeed up for debate. The most recent study Peace and Authoritarianism (Peacebuilding and Authoritarianism: The Unintended Consequences of UN Engagement in Post-Conflict Settings - United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (unu.edu)) by UNU is interesting in the recognizing this un intended consequence of our engagement in post conflict recovery.

Ulrika Jonsson 

I am not aware of research that looks at the impact of Covid-19 on intergroup trust. While there could be a connections (via reduced economic activitiy, travel, social interaction) it appears to be quite a long chain with different, perhaps even competing causal processes.  

Nevertheless, the World Bank has collected high-frequency survey data in dozens of low-income countries around since March/April 2020 and among the main indicators (food security, education, health, income and coping), trust in the government is one of their indicators. So, you could look into that.

Here's the list of countries for which data (and sometimes country briefs) are available: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lsms/brief/lsms-launches-high-fre…

Together with some colleagues we synthesized the data for several African countries till August 2020 on food security, education, health and the economy: https://www.cmi.no/publications/7391-household-wellbeing-and-coping-str…

Carlo Koos 

Thanks very much for sharing the available and related resources on this topic. I will follow any upcoming research with a lot of interest!

Thanks, Carlo for the post. 

My name is Marina Kumskova and I am a senior policy and advocacy advisor at GPPAC. 

I just wanted to complement your post by a few remarks from local peacebuilders from Eastern Europe during the consultations we have conducted with UNDP earlier this year. We should not be forgetting about the critical role of peacebuilders in the context of protracted crisis.

The protracted and unresolved conflicts in the region have become a part of life for peacebuilders. Peace, where it exists, is extremely fragile, and people suffer from great psychological pain. This situation created the entire generation of people suffering from conflict-related trauma that continues to be unaddressed. There is a great need for trauma healing through the provision of mental health and psychological support to those who have been both directly and indirectly affected by conflicts, especially refugees and displaced persons, but also all people within communities.

However, this is not the only area of concern. Imagine yourself trying to make the change in your community and the national governments do not have a buy-in. Local peacebuilders who can access funding are lucky; however, many of them are doing this work for free on a voluntary basis. When the conflict is protracted, how long can your enthusiasm last? 5 years, 6 years of commitment. Then, you accept the reality. A journey towards peace is work and a struggle. It takes emotional toll. It is hard to have this sense of struggle for a long time because everyone just wants a peaceful life. This leads to many peacebuilders simply adapting and working with what they have. 

This may be a small point; however, this point is hard to bring in the policy discussion as there is no policy "language" that supports this point; however, this is an important consideration of the extent to which protracted crisis can be resolved. 

Priyanthi Fernando thank you for bringing in a different perspective. I completely agree with this view, and as many case studies have shown, 'conflicts' last even beyond the end of 'armed' conflict/war because the root causes have not been addressed. Even if sometimes the root causes are acknowledged, the complexity of the causes, including understanding the history in-depth, is not given as nearly enough attention that all the 'post-war'/transitional processes/mechanisms are given. But, as you said, this analysis should go beyond armed conflict and should be applied to every aspect of violence/conflict, and at every level.

Dear Priyanthi, 

Thanks for your insights. 

I wanted to share some lessons from GPPAC members in Uganda - CECORE, who in the SDG16+ country report: https://gppac.net/files/2020-07/GPPAC%20SDG%20Report%20Uganda_Final_dig…, drew the connections between COVID-19 and violence. 

Land and domestic violence were cited as the most prevalent conflicts across all the sample districts. Those most affected by the lockdown have been women, due to gender socialised roles; youth in the informal sector; those differently abled (disabled); pregnant women, and those suffering from chronic illnesses. For example, the elderly and those living with disabilities have been arrested for failing to reach home before curfew time, and pregnant mothers have faced life-threatening challenges while being denied quick access to health facilities.13 Participants noted that this has a negative influence on peace. These dynamics partly influenced study findings. The research also indicated that COVID-19 will have a longer lasting impact on peace as the livelihoods of people who depend on informal businesses, such as women and youth, have been severely disrupted.

An increase in domestic violence was partly attributed to COVID-19 – mostly triggered by tensions created when individuals who used to be “bread winners” were no longer able to provide, as a result of the lockdown. In less than one month into the lockdown, the Ministry of Gender Labour, and Social Development already reported that over 3,000 cases of domestic violence were registered.

Although the government ordered the suspension of all land transactions, evictions, etc. as a way to manage violence during the COVID-19 lockdown, violent land-related conflicts continue to escalate. Research participants also saw the COVID-19 pandemic and related containment and prevention measures as leading to violent conflicts. While enforcing the government directives on COVID-19, violence has been meted out against citizens, including killings. 

Their key recommendation was that the international community and donors should prioritise funding towards SDG 16+ targets, and help ensure these funds will address the COVID-19 pandemic and its localised impact on human security.

Also, to add to the points already raised, I wanted to share a couple of principles that our members from Uganda have developed to support the localisation of SDG16+. 

1) Localisation needs to build on what is there. The entry point for localisation in Uganda is local planning and local governance structures at the district, sub-county, and parish levels. Especially Local Councils I, III, and V. There is also, at these local levels, little knowledge and awareness about the SDGs and how they can support their capacities and needs. Localisation should, therefore, be stipulated as one of the roles of the chief administrative officers, sub-county chiefs, and Local Council I leaders so that they integrate localisation into their day-to-day work. This should include facilitating local ownership of the goals, developing inclusive SDG 16+ strategies, and their inclusive implementation.

2) SDG 16+ needs to affect change at the community level. This is where peace and development issues such as violent conflicts and tensions; poverty; illiteracy; social, political, and economic inequalities, etc. have most direct impact. Those most affected are best placed to lead the process to transform themselves. This requires a holistic and inclusive approach, which means addressing all SDG 16+ related goals and targets with all actors, leaving no one behind.

3) Ownership is key—build outwards. Local councils and other local actors should be involved in a way that they have a stake in and jointly own SDG 16+, and its implementation. Ownership can be enhanced by building the capacity of local actors to actively participate.

4) SDG 16+ strategies and implementation should be taken forward in a holistic manner. The goals should be incorporated into all strategies of different structures, and integrated into all programmes and service delivery.

5) Build broad local support structures for SDG 16+. NGOs, community-based and faithbased organisations, as well as elected and traditional leaders at the community level, need to work collectively with interest groups and local communities towards common goals.

6) Invest in the process of local ownership of goals and solutions. This includes sensitisation, raising SDG awareness, as well as seeking and facilitating involvement and participation of local communities.

7) Ensure development, availability of, and access to localised SDG 16+ indicators and data at the local level.

Fantastic GREGORY A CONNOR many thanks for sharing. These are very useful.

Thanks a lot Monica!

Hi colleagues,

It is great to join such an interesting discussion. I am Doruk Ergun, working with UNDP Crisis Bureau as a Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Consultant.

Over the past few months, we have conducted five regional consultations with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), bringing together peacebuilding practitioners across the globe to discuss how COVID-19 has impacted the work of infrastructures for peace (I4Ps) and how the international community should further support peacebuilders on the ground.

The pandemic presented major barriers to peacebuilders, including through limiting the opportunities for in-person dialogue and consensus building which form the backbone of peacebuilding engagement or through shifting the already limited and unpredictable sources of funding away from peacebuilding work. With the heavy-handed government response across many contexts undermining civic space, peacebuilders have found their opportunity to engage in peacebuilding work under further stress. Through deepening inequalities and exclusion, eroding trust in social, national, regional, and global institutions, exacerbating insecurity, and deepening trends of social unrest and democratic backsliding, the pandemic has also significantly altered the conflict contexts and systems that I4Ps operate in.

Yet against all of these challenges, I4Ps have played critical roles as first responders to addressing pandemic-related needs, providing much needed early warning capacities, raising awareness on the pandemic, addressing gender-based violence, advancing peace education, and promoting resilience against the risks to social cohesion, peace and security that the pandemic has exacerbated.

Throughout our consultations, many peacebuilders have highlighted the need for prioritizing human security in COVID-19 response, improving the availability of predictable, long-term and sustainable funding and financing opportunities for peacebuilding, and supporting the development of better tools, indicators and capacities for measuring the impact of I4Ps on the ground. They have also raised the need for more space for I4Ps to operate, through supporting the recognition, status and protection of peacebuilders, expanding efforts to build national frameworks and policies on peacebuilding, strengthening regional peacebuilding partnerships, and improving the coordination and complementarity among peacebuilders across all levels.

We look forward to sharing with you the summary results of our consultation series over the next few weeks. In the meantime, you can read the results of the regional consultations prepared by GPPAC through this link. Hoping to hear more from our GPPAC partners in this discussion. Looking very much forward to your reactions.

Thanks so much Doruk.

Hello all, I’m Ellie Cumberbatch, a Consultant at the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). Thank you to the moderators for the invitation to reflect upon this topic, and for the insightful discussions that have taken place so far. 

As mentioned by Doruk, in recent months GPPAC partnered with the UNDP to host five regional consultations with the aim of unpacking how local peacebuilders have adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic, reflecting upon the lessons learned, and developing holistic and inclusive approaches to strengthen Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps). These consultations highlighted that COVID-19 has placed considerable stress upon I4Ps, with strong implications for peace and development. The work of local peacebuilders has been particularly affected, with such actors becoming the first respondents to the crisis, and bearing the immediate impact of the social, economic, political and security consequences.

In light of these challenges, it is important to highlight that the COVID-19 pandemic is a launchpad that offers a unique opportunity to facilitate a transformative change of I4Ps in order to get back on track to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. On the basis of GPPAC and UNDP’s shared learning, the following priority areas have been identified as being key to strengthening the role of I4Ps in sustaining peace when moving forward:

Priority 1: To improve the multi-stakeholder and inclusive nature of infrastructures for peace:

• Infrastructures for peace should conduct adequate stakeholder mapping and seek relevant partnerships. Conducting stakeholder mapping increases understanding of the linkages between actors and the issues, and may bring to light previously unknown alliances, conflicts or more general insights.
• Infrastructures for peace should engage and take into consideration local needs, expertise and realities. In order to appropriately determine peacebuilding and development priorities, I4Ps need to engage with local peacebuilders. This requires time and resources to engage with local peacebuilding actors in a systematic and intentional manner from an early stage with a guaranteed feedback loop.
• Infrastructures for peace should be inclusive of and engage with women and young peacebuilding experts. I4Ps should be inclusive in their own structures, as well as take a deliberate effort to engage with a diverse range of peacebuilders, including women and young peacebuilders

Priority 2: To ensure coordination and complementarity among infrastructures for peace: 

• Infrastructures for peace should coordinate and support ongoing peacebuilding work. All stakeholders need to ensure that any efforts to address crisis and violence are leveraged to support ongoing peacebuilding work. 
• Infrastructures for peace should be strengthened at the regional level and engage regional and sub-regional arrangements. Since many conflicts spill over national borders, regional peacebuilding coordination needs to be strengthened and involve regional actors, including (sub-)regional organisations and development banks. 
• Infrastructures for peace should integrate opportunities for remote engagement and coordination. The adoption of a common conceptual framework for digital inclusion is required to strengthen meaningful virtual engagement of women in all their diversity, young people, indigenous groups, people from rural and remote areas, to name a few, in the work of I4Ps. 

Priority 3: To provide and protect local infrastructures for peace:

• Infrastructures for peace should support capacity building for local peacebuilders. This includes supporting the establishment and development of national and regional networks of local peacebuilders and independent women’s mediators networks to serve as platforms for facilitated peer learning and support, 
• Infrastructures for peace should address the accountability deficit. The principles of international law must be updated to reflect the unique situation of local peacebuilders. I4Ps can work with national governments to create an enabling environment for local peacebuilders by putting in place appropriate legal and policy frameworks that clearly define the role, mandate and protections for local peacebuilders. 

Priority 4: To integrate human security principles into the work of infrastructures for peace:

• Infrastructures for peace should promote a culture of peace. It is crucial to counter hate speech; help to overcome hostility and distrust between various actors; and build an environment of mutual support and trust. 
• Infrastructures for peace should encourage local peacebuilders’ involvement in security processes. Support is required to raise the capacity of youth and women to track arms proliferation within communities and engage on disarmament and security matters. Normally, local peacebuilders do not engage on the questions of security and disarmament; however, this is an oversight that creates silos between traditional security and sustaining peace. 
• Infrastructures for peace should support trauma healing. Provision of the necessary mental health and psychosocial support for all people directly or indirectly affected by COVID-19. There is an urgent need for trauma healing for everyone who has experienced conflict. 

Priority 5: To ensure adequate and quality financing for infrastructures for peace:

• Infrastructures for peace should have sustainable and adequate funding. National governments can support peacebuilding through dedicated budgetary allocations for the implementation of national and sub-regional peacebuilding frameworks and policies. However, to support national peacebuilding capacities, considerable innovation is required if the mandates of I4Ps are to be strengthened. 
• Funding for local infrastructures for peace needs to be prioritised. Funds should be deployed to support the strengthening of local peacebuilding work and local ownership. This includes shifting the current funding models in a way that encourages local decision-making on the priorities and approaches for achieving objectives determined through an inclusive process and that enables for simplified and less burdensome fundraising process. 
• Infrastructures for peace should benefit from flexible financing. The donor community should establish more unrestricted and flexible funding. This will allow local peacebuilders to break the cycle of dependence on external grant funding and sustain local ownership.

Priority 6: To ensure that infrastructures for peace deliver impact at the local level:

• Infrastructures for peace should be informed with locally-led and inclusive data collection methods. The development of representative community monitoring mechanisms, including in all regions, with the access to the most remote areas (i.e., early warning and early response mechanisms informed by community monitors) is a way to improve data sharing and ensure informed action. 
• Infrastructures for peace should normalise the flexibility of data collection. The efforts to determine and define what impact means at the local level needs to be rooted in community-led determination of impact. Inclusive indicators need to be developed on the basis of context-specific drivers of instability and sources of resilience.

It would be interesting to look further into how to move forward with certain aspects of this learning- particularly with regards to how to gain political commitment to advance a human security approach, how to define quality financing for local peacebuilding, and how to measure impact in a manner which is people-centred. If there are any available studies on these topics that could be shared, it would be very much appreciated. Looking forward to hearing your responses.

Thank you very much Doruk Ergun and Ellie Cumberbatch for sharing information on this very important initiative on infrastructures for peace (I4P). The findings from the consultations and the highlighted priorities that have emerged for peacebuilders in the context of the current pandemic are very useful. Many thanks for also sharing the link to the summaries of the regional consultations, which will be particularly useful for this ongoing initiative aiming to identify the SDG 16 trends (including on peace & security) during Covid-19. 

There are multiple challenges that have increased with the ongoing pandemic, and the priorities that have been surfaced through your consultations really show us the importance to align our peace & security efforts  with these new realities. What is interesting to note, from your post is also the importance of harnessing the opportunities that are presented with the pandemic encouraging us to get back on track on achieving the SDGs. Thanks a lot for highlighting this perspective and it would be interesting to hear any other reflections on this.  

Thank you for highlighting this Priyanthi Fernando. The research that was conducted by SLRC in Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Pakistan, Nepal, and Uganda, on the link between provision of services and state legitimacy, highlights the following research findings: (1) State legitimacy is co-constructed, not transactional – eg. contrary to the belief that citizens accept the state’s authority when they receive basic services from the state fairly, it is argued that state and social groups co-construct these expectations and beliefs about the state; (2) satisfaction with certain services has an impact on perceptions of state legitimacy, however, the types of services that was important in the construction of state legitimacy differed across the different countries studied; (3) Basic services may not necessarily break or make a state, but they provide moments when citizens learn the degree to which the state respects them as citizens. Similarly, a negative experience of the services can lead to wider delegitimating narratives about the state; (4) The state may not need to legitimate its power to all citizens in order to maintain its power, i.e. the degree to which the state legitimates its power varies depending on different societal groups. For example, the legitimation that a state directs at a group depends on how central that group is to the polity.

This is a very brief summary, but the full report ‘Reconstructing our understanding of the link between services and state legitimacy’ is available here.

Linking to the current context  - it would be interesting to understand how state legitimacy is impacted due to the (mis)management of the COVID-19 pandemic, and basic service delivery pertaining to this. 

Natasha Palansuriya  thank you for that clear summary and the link.  I agree that it would be interesting to see how state legitimacy is negotiated/co-created during the pandemic. This also relates to the initial framing of this discussion where the moderators invited us to reflect on how the pandemic has impacted state-sponsored and community-level conflicts,  I see this as particularly relevant in contexts like  the Philippines or Sri Lanka or even India where the pandemic has provided the smokescreen for increased militarisation and unleashing of state violence.  

Thank you for capturing an extremely pertinent nuance that often gets lost in conversation, Priyanthi. In the current context where the Global South is ravaged by the COVID-19 pandemic, I reckon the women, peace and security agenda have become that much more crucial topics of discussion. I would also like to pose the question if the concept of justice should be revisited in the current context. Given the recent trends in the region, should the State response to pandemic be explored in relation to its implication on justice? Instances such as the debate vis a vis burial of Muslim’s succumbing to COVID-19 in Sri Lanka raised particular challenges to justice. Further, the role of women in conflict was also highlighted during the pandemic in the Global South, in some instances raising questions regarding justice. This was seen in India with the arrest of activist Natasha Narwal under the controversial Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act for her alleged role in the Delhi riots, 2020. 

Thank you Priyanthi Fernando for prompting this crucial discussion. I hope that this thread will revive this conversation especially regarding the WPS agenda, and the importance of it given the current context. I would like to invite Carlo Koos to share his thoughts here too, as he brought up the topic in his previous comment. Thank you!

Thanks a lot for highlighting this very important discussion and for encouraging a conversation on trends for peace & security in the global south. There are certainly many important findings to share, and we hope for further inputs, reflections, and research findings on this topics from participants in this e-discussion.

There are many interesting studies available that look into some of the early trends for peace & security in the context of Covid-19, such as a study from UN Women assessing WPS in Asia-Pacific ap-wps-covid-in-asia-pacific.pdf (unwomen.org) highlighting that "COVID-19 may also create additional constraints on conflict environments, including limitations on peacekeeping rotations, cessation of mediation and diplomatic efforts, and redirection of security-sector focus away from containing threats such as terrorism. These could have profound impacts on communities, leaving women and girls especially vulnerable to eruptions of violence and relapses of conflict".

Another important study issue-brief-covid-19-and-ending-violence-against-women-and-girls-en.pdf (unwomen.org) is looking at how violence against women and girls have drastically increased during the pandemic "as security, health and money worries heighten tensions and strains accentuated by cramped and confined living conditions". It also mentions the worrying trends of increased ICT-facilitated and online gender-based violence that have skyrocketed during the pandemic. Are there any specific studies and research on this topic that could be shared with this group?

From ACCORD, there is a very interesting Covid-19 conflict and resilience monitor in Africa COVID-19 Conflict & Resilience Monitor – 12 May 2021 – ACCORD that gives us a snapshot of the correlation between Covid-19 and levels of conflict on the continent. It would be interesting to learn more about this tool and what it can tell us on the recent trends. 

These are just a few interesting studies that are highlighting this important topic on Peace & Security in the context of Covid-19. Please share your thoughts, inputs and research. We look forward to hearing from you!

Thanks, Priyanthi, for pointing this out. 

I just wanted to comment on this flagging that many peacebuilders now are currently busy with COVID-19 response as indicated by some of our members in the Pacific. Also, this format for dialogue perhaps hard for many peacebuilders to attend as the virtual dialogue could prove more action; however, virtual dialogue is hard to have given the current nature of conversations. 

Therefore, I am sharing some of the SDG16+ Country Reports from GPPAC members in

Cameroon (2019): https://gppac.net/resources/cameroon-sdg-16-cameroon-progress-towards-p…

Ghana (2019): https://gppac.net/resources/sdg-16-ghana-progress-towards-peaceful-just…

Uganda (2020): https://gppac.net/files/2020-07/GPPAC%20SDG%20Report%20Uganda_Final_dig…

I hope some of the recommendations are very useful for the outcome of this dialogue. 

Dear Jonas, 

Thanks for your input. 

I just wanted to add a quick point on financing for peacebuilding to the dialogue. 

Currently, GPPAC and Dag Hammarskjold Foundation are working to address the limitations faced by the donor community and to increase the efficacy of peacebuilding programming. 

Funders should prioritize modalities that enable local peacebuilders to set their own agenda on SDG16+, better generate, implement, and scale their own solutions and processes and sustain their work outside of the endless cycle of external grants and funders. 

In this, we have developed a number of principles:

Utilize the most flexible funding instruments available to support local peacebuilders, preferably providing unrestricted and not project-focused funding.
Invest in mechanism that generate sustainability for local organizations, so they can break the cycle of dependence on external grant funding.
Prioritize participatory funding approaches that cross thematic silos and are intersectional – many grassroots organizations don’t “categorize” their work into the boxes the international community assigns (e.g., women’s rights, access to justice, etc.).
One way to do this is through participatory grantmaking approaches in which local organizations make decisions about how resources are deployed.
Fund people, not projects. Focus on a mix of urgent needs, bold and innovative ideas to sustain local peacebuilding and helping to build long term infrastructure for the movement and ecosystem of peacebuilding organizations.

If funding through INGOs or intermediaries, create standards for authentic partnership with local organizations based on their needs and hold donors and funding recipients accountable to those standards.
Conceptualize resources beyond money. Support networks, convening and work that strengthens horizontal and vertical relationships and trust between and among activists, funders and experts (local and international) that enable the reciprocal sharing of information and non-financial resources.
Support community-led determination of impact and less administrative burden through flexible, qualitative or verbal monitoring and evaluation, and regular reflection on and assessment of learning and progress. Peacebuilding doesn’t often show rapid or
quantitative results and blueprint indicators often employed by the international community often fail to capture long-term and complex social change processes.
Considering realistic approaches to pooled risk. The security of local peacebuilders who work on the frontlines of dangerous situations should be paramount in funding approaches, as well as the reality that donors have concerns related to risk. Naming and dispelling potential assumptions related to these concerns is important.

We hope these principles would be useful not only in the context of peacebuilding but further build on good practices by the development donors.

Marina Kumskova I will chime in quickly to highlight the point about funding people not projects. I think this point needs to be further underlined when dealing with young peacebuilders, many of whom organize through online and informal networks and not in NGOs. As a result, there is little funding available to support their work and ideas. Funders must address this gap, and become more comfortable investing in individuals and movements that spring up in response to conflict, repressive state responses, and/or violent incidents. 

Thanks Priyanthi Fernando!

Kindly note that the moderated discussion is now concluded, however, this forum/page will remain open until the end of June to allow for further discussions and inputs. So please, we encourage all participants to continue sharing your reflections on the topic of peace & security, and we will take into account and include all inputs in the final summary. 

Many thanks!